Abstract:

This study explores how conditional cooperation strategies affect collective action in a public good game, particularly those resembling international climate negotiations. We rely on a laboratory economic experiment to investigate the relationship between group size and cooperation under a baseline and a common commitment condition. Results show that common commitment mechanisms significantly enhance and stabilize cooperation, even in larger groups, provided the group marginal return is sufficiently high. These findings have critical implications for designing international climate agreements and other public good provision systems.

About the SEEMS Seminars

Over the past years the number of researchers at UvA Economics & Business that work on Environmental Economics and Sustainability has increased significantly. To provide a natural meeting place for them, we have started a series of Seminars on Environmental Economics and Management of Sustainability (SEEMS).

The series’ first main goal is to increase the visibility of Environmental Economics and the Management of Sustainability at UvA and the visibility of UvA within these fields. Its second main goal is to give PhD candidates working on topics in these fields access to the frontier of knowledge, and to provide them with a training ground where they can present and discuss their ideas.

Are you interested?

This will be a hybrid seminar. If you are interested in joining this seminar, please send an email to the secretariat of ASF at asf-feb@uva.nl.