We study the evolution of public adaptation to physical climate risk when political preferences are shaped by rising climate risk and growing economic inequality. Economic polarization implies tighter financial conditions for more households, undermining private efforts to limit the direct impact of climate change. Political support for public intervention to preserve habitable land evolves over time when households differ in age, income and beliefs about the intervention efficacy. The rise in climate risk increases support for public adaptation. If beliefs are not too dispersed, this leads to the eventual tipping of the political equilibrium, favouring a new political coalition that supports more public adaptation. A rise in inequality may induce an additional political tipping point but does not always increase public adaptation, thus highlighting the importance of controlling economic inequality in the fight against climate change. We further show that public intervention is undermined by a "tragedy of the horizon" effect as the economy fails to internalize the long term benefits for future generations. This prevents public adaptation from converging to the long-term social optimum even when protective investment is highest.
Inhabitants of dryland ecosystems often make a living by herding cattle in a (semi) nomadic way. People herding mobile herds have to make choices about how many animals to keep and where and for how long their animals can graze. A longer grazing time allows the animal population to expand more quickly, but at the same time it also puts heavier pressure on the vegetation and hence the long term stability of the ecosystem. Using the theory of dynamical systems we have analyzed this two-fold effect of the choice of grazing times.