Abstract:

Developing countries face the difficult problem of allocating limited state funds across many underprovided public goods. Yet they also spend billions of dollars paying for a private good - electricity - directly through subsidies and indirectly through theft. In this paper we explain how a high-theft equilibrium can sustain even though developing country state utilities have similar enforcement options as those in the developed world. We suggest that costly enforcement actions that must be targeted and are observable can lead to negative spillovers with increased non-payment and thus lower revenue rather than increase it. We also evaluate alternative enforcement measures and show that revenues can be raised in the status quo, albeit falling short of total unpaid dues. 

About the SEEMS Seminars

Over the past years the number of researchers at UvA Economics & Business that work on Environmental Economics and Sustainability has increased significantly. To provide a natural meeting place for them, we have started a series of Seminars on Environmental Economics and Management of Sustainability (SEEMS).

The series’ first main goal is to increase the visibility of Environmental Economics and the Management of Sustainability at UvA and the visibility of UvA within these fields. Its second main goal is to give PhD candidates working on topics in these fields access to the frontier of knowledge, and to provide them with a training ground where they can present and discuss their ideas.

Are you interested?

This will be a hybrid seminar. If you are interested in joining this seminar, please send an email to the secretariat of ASF at asf-feb@uva.nl.